Science & Technology

Spy in the Shadows: DRDO Guest House Manager’s Secret Link to Pakistan’s ISI

A Pattern of Espionage Across India

In recent years, Indian security forces have repeatedly apprehended individuals accused of passing critical defence information to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). From serving soldiers to social media influencers, these cases reveal a persistent threat of espionage targeting sensitive military sites. The latest arrest from Rajasthan’s Jaisalmer adds another chapter to this troubling narrative—highlighting how even a civilian employee in a key defence location can become a conduit for classified leaks.

The Man Behind the Leak

Mahendra Prasad, a native of Almora in Uttarakhand, had been employed as the manager of a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) guest house in Jaisalmer’s Chandan area since 2008. On August 4, authorities took him into custody for allegedly supplying strategic information to Pakistan’s ISI.

His posting was no ordinary desk job. The facility, located within the Pokhran Field Firing Range—a core testing ground for India’s weapons and defence systems—is frequented by senior scientists, military officers, and defence specialists. This proximity gave Prasad unique access to cthat, in the wrong hands, could reveal the nature and timing of classified trials.

The Method of Espionage

Security officials revealed that Prasad’s activities had been monitored for a considerable time before his arrest. A forensic check of his mobile phone exposed years of contact with Pakistani handlers. For at least five years, he had been transmitting PDF documents listing the names of guests staying at the DRDO facility. These lists, seemingly mundane, provided ISI operatives with valuable insight into ongoing projects and weapon tests at the Pokhran range.

Investigators say “substantial proof” was recovered from his phone and chat history, pointing to a long-running breach. The scale and duration of the leak are now under review by intelligence agencies. Given the site’s proximity—barely 200 kilometres from the Pakistan border—such information could have directly assisted hostile surveillance and planning.

Operation Sindoor and the Heightened Crackdown

Prasad’s arrest comes amid intensified counter-espionage measures after “Operation Sindoor” in early May, which followed the Pahalgam terror attack and heightened military tensions. During Operation Sindoor, Indian armed forces targeted terrorist hubs in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir, eliminating over 100 militants from groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The Pakistani response included cross-border shelling, attempted drone strikes, and air defence activity, prompting further Indian counter strikes that crippled enemy radar, communication centres, and air bases.

Since then, agencies have been aggressively pursuing suspected ISI informants. In Jaisalmer itself, another alleged spy, Shakoor Khan—a government employee with political connections—was arrested just days before Prasad. Both cases are part of a larger web of intelligence leaks being mapped by national agencies.

Other Espionage Suspects: From Soldiers to YouTubers

The post-Sindoor sweep has produced arrests across multiple states. In May, more than 15 individuals from Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and elsewhere were detained on suspicion of working for Pakistan. Among the most notable was Jyoti Malhotra, a popular YouTuber from Hisar, who allegedly used her platform to interact with Pakistani handlers while extracting sensitive defence information.

Also caught were Devendra Singh, a 25-year-old postgraduate from Haryana’s Kaithal district; Shahzad, a businessman from Rampur in Uttar Pradesh; and Moti Ram Jat, a Central Reserve Police Force jawan accused of passing security updates to Pakistan since 2023.

These cases echo earlier instances of “Madam N” and other operatives who used social media or personal influence to cultivate contacts, sometimes under the guise of casual friendship, romance, or business partnerships. Such non-traditional recruitment methods make detection harder and illustrate ISI’s evolving tactics.

The Larger Threat

The repeated exposure of espionage networks underscores a persistent vulnerability—Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus continues to target individuals embedded in India’s defence ecosystem, regardless of rank or role. Civilian employees, often overlooked in security drills, can provide critical footholds for foreign operatives. Mobile messaging apps, social media, and encrypted platforms make the flow of information faster, harder to trace, and more dangerous.

Constant Vigilance Required

Mahendra Prasad’s case is a reminder that espionage is not always the work of shadowy agents in foreign capitals—it can emerge quietly from within trusted circles. With India’s defence facilities under constant watch by adversarial agencies, each leak, no matter how minor it seems, can compromise operational secrecy.

While security agencies have intensified monitoring and cracked down on suspects, the human factor—greed, ideology, coercion, or vanity—remains the weakest link. In an age where intelligence can be stolen in seconds and sent across borders with a click, India’s defence against espionage must be as relentless as the threats it faces.

 

(With agency inputs)